● What does it mean that the security of 256-bit ECDSA, and therefore Bitcoin keys, is 128 bits? Bastien Teinturier: Sure. So right now, when we announced the channel on the network, we explicitly announced node IDs and the Bitcoin keys that are inside the multisig 2-of-2, and people verified that the output that we are referencing is actually locked with the script hash of multisig 2-of-2 of those two keys, so you can only use it with scripts that really follow the format of Lightning channels without taproot. Greg Sanders: Yeah, I can speak to that a bit. Yeah, this has never been really relied upon. Greg Sanders: Yeah, if I can jump in. So, there actually are a number of different hardware devices that can run the Jade firmware. So, if you want to learn more about that topic, it’s not too long, something like an hour or so, 바이낸스 수수료 (Mohotango's website) walking through all the details of that proposal.
It sounds like that was a several-day meeting. And if mempool stays full with a very high feerate for a few months, then there’s an incentive to start attacking, and I think we should be ready for that before it happens. So, if the other person does not want to pay, they can just sign off on it; and if they want to have the closing transaction a higher priority, they have to actually pay more and then the other party can just sign off, so there’s no deadlock here anymore. For LN-Symmetry, I didn’t have to pull this around because there’s no penalties, so I just, in memory, hold these nonces and then complete signatures just in time. Fournier then goes on to describe several benefits of BLS-based attestations. Mark Erhardt: And this will always terminate, because the person that wants to close the channel, of course, already says, "Hey, I want to pay this amount and it’ll be taken from my portion of the channel". So, whenever you say that you want to mutual close your channel, the only one who is going to pay the fees for that is the party who initially opened that channel, so they don’t have an incentive, they really don’t want to overpay the fee.
Bitcoin is arguably one of the lesser evil representations of digital currency due to being de-centralized. 12952: after being deprecated for several major release and disabled by default in the upcoming 0.17 release, the built-in accounts system in Bitcoin Core has been removed from the master development branch. ● lnd v0.16.0-beta.rc1 is a release candidate for a new major version of this popular LN implementation. ● Lying: where an oracle signs for an outcome that users know is wrong. We don’t know exactly how we would do that, those proofs, and how we would make sure that those proofs cannot be reused, how we would track channel closing differently than just watching onchain. That’s why we’re not doing that right now, and that’s why most people will just keep announcing the output that really corresponds to the channel so that when it gets spent, people actually notice it and can remove it from that graph and know that they cannot route through that channel anymore. As we’ve shown in earlier parts of this series, bech32 addresses are better in almost every way than legacy addresses-they allow users to save fees, they’re easier to transcribe, address typos can be located, and they’re more efficient in QR codes.
Another problem was accepting all-lowercase bech32 addresses but not all-uppercase bech32 addresses. The main question that we had during the Summit is that there’s work when the current proposal spends the MuSig2 output for both commitment transactions and splices and mutual closes, which means that we have to manage nonce-state, MuSig2 nonce-state in many places, and it’s potentially dangerous because managing those nonces correctly is really important for security. So, we need to change that, because we need to allow taproot, which means allowing also input, especially if we use MuSig2; we don’t want to reveal the internal keys. The advantage of this method is that it allows the spender to prevent a payment from succeeding up until the last moment, allowing them to unilaterally cancel stuck payments or even try sending the same payment over multiple routes simultaneously to see which succeeds the fastest (before canceling the slower payments).